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DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR
NONTENURED FACULTY IN PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
LONG OVERDUE
The value of the tenure system is one of the most important
and controversial issues in contemporary academia. The per-
ceived teacher surplus, greater budget restrictions, and grow-
ing demands for minority hiring are among the forces that are
pressuring colleges and universities to examine closely their
traditional promotion policies. Moreover, increasing litigation
involving Constitutional guarantees, state statutes, and institu-
tional contracts has recently intensified the debate over both
the efficacy and ethics of this unique employment system. Is
tenure a progressive device, preserving academic freedom and
encouraging scholarly initiative, or is it a harmful, anach-
ronistic force, protecting entrenched ideas and fostering
incompetency?'
The system of tenure in American higher education has been
advanced as necessary to protect academic freedom 2 and to en-
courage faculty innovation and independence of judgment.3 The
system has not been immune from attack.4 Whether or not the
I Scoles, Bauman, Gilman, Northridge & Sowell, Motivating the Law School
Faculty in the Twenty-First Century: Is There Life in Tenure?, 30 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1, 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Scoles].
2 "Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) Freedom of teaching
and research and of extramural activities and (2) a sufficient degree of economic
security to make the profession attractive to men and women of ability." AMERm-
CAN ASs'N OF UNWVERsITY PROFEssoRs, Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940
Statement of Principles-Proposed Interpretive Comments, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL.
26, 27 (1970).
3 "Academic freedom and tenure do not exist because of a peculiar solicitude
for the human beings who staff our academic institutions. They exist, instead, in
order that society may have the benefit of honest judgment and independent criti-
cism which otherwise might be withheld because of fear of offending a dominant
social group or a transient social attitude." BYSE & JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION (1959), quoted in Academic Tenure at Harvard University, 58
A.A.U.P. BULL. 62, 63 (1972).
See, e.g., Worzella v. Board of Regents, 77 S.D. 447, 448, 93 N.W.2d 412,
412 (1958); Scoles, supra note 1, at 8-11; Lanzarone, Teacher Tenure-Some Pro-
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reasons for the tenure system are sound and its purposes lauda-
tory, tenure has resulted in a classification scheme for faculty
members which has had profound effects on their legal and con-
stitutional rights. It is this issue regarding tenure which is to be
examined here.
This Note will consider the constitutional rights of nonten-
ured faculty in public colleges and universities, as interpreted in
recent United States Supreme Court decisions. It will also analyze
the rules and regulations of the West Virginia Board of Regents
and a recently enacted statute in West Virginia affecting the
rights of nontenured faculty. However, the rights of nontenured
teachers in public schools, insofar as these rights differ from those
of faculty in higher education,5 and the issues with respect to dis-
missal for cause of tenured faculty are beyond the scope of this
Note.
6
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS7
A. The Right-Privilege Dichotomy
Until the early 1970's8 the right of public employees to proce-
dural due process was controlled by the right-privilege dichotomy.
posals For Change, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 526 (1974); Academic Tenure at Harvard
University, 58 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 62 (1972).
' Generally, there is no distinction between teachers and college faculty as far
as their rights are concerned. State statutes, however, may make such a distinc-
tion. In West Virginia the term public school has been held to relate to schools
established and maintained at public expense, embracing elementary and secon-
dary schools normally supported by county or local authorities, and not to colleges
or universities. Kondos v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 154 W. Va. 276, 175
S.E.2d 165 (1970). Statutes applicable to "public school" teachers are found in
chapter 18A of the West Virginia Code; statutes governing college and university
teachers are found in section 26 of chapter 18.
6 See generally Fleming, Teacher Dismissal for Cause: Public and Private
Morality, 7 J.L. & EDuc. 423 (1978); Jacobsen, Sperry & Jensen, The Dismissal
and Non-Reemployment of Teachers, 1 J.L. & EDuc. 435 (1972).
7 The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution has procedu-
ral and substantive connotations. Substantive due process deals with questions of
deprivation by a state of a substantive right, i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of
as3ociation, or freedom to wear a hair or dress style, etc. Procedural due process,
on the other hand, deals with questions as to whether a state follows a fair proce-
dure when it attempts to interfere with life, liberty, or property.
I See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 83
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Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford9 succinctly
expressed the distinction in the doctrine: "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." 10 This distinction was used to jus-
tify the denial of constitutional protection to a federal employee
discharged because of alleged disloyalty."' In Joint Anti-Fascist
Committee v. McGrath,1 2 another loyalty case, the Court began to
question the viability of the dichotomy as evidenced by the state-
ment of Justice Jackson: "The fact that one does not have a legal
right to get or keep a government post does not mean that he can
be adjudged ineligible illegally. 1 3 The right-privilege dichotomy
gained support in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. Mc-
Elroy 4 in which Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted
the well-settled principle that "government employment, in the
absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing
officer," 15 and where the private interest affected is such a privi-
lege, notice and hearing are not required.16 The opinion did ad-
mit, however, that characterization of a private interest as a privi-
lege may be an oversimplification. 17 The lack of standards for
determining whether the affected interest is a right or a privilege
subsequently persuaded the Court not to rely on the distinction.
Arguing that public assistance benefits, for example, are a privi-
lege and not a right, reasoned the Court, does not meet the con-
stitutional challenge.18
The Supreme Court officially ratified this significant change
in its analysis of claims of entitlement to due process in Board of
Regents v. Roth " where the Court explicitly and emphatically
stated that it "has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinc-
' 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
10 Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
11 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd mem. by an
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
12 341 U.S. 123 (1950).
13 Id. at 185.
14 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
16 Id. at 896.
1 Id. at 898.
17 Id. at 895.
Is Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969). See also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
1980]
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tion between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern
the applicability of procedural due process rights. '20
B. Analysis of the Decisions in Roth and Sindermann
Board of Regents v. Roth21 and Perry v. Sindermann,22 two
Supreme Court cases decided on the same day, are especially sig-
nificant since they both directly concerned the rights of nonten-
ured faculty. In Roth, an assistant professor at Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh who had been hired for his first teaching job
on a one-year probationary appointment23 was notified without a
statement of reasons in January of that year that his contract
would not be renewed for the subsequent academic year. Prior to
notification of non-renewal Roth had openly criticized the univer-
sity administration during a period of conflict on campus. Roth
brought suit in federal district court24 claiming that his rights of
free speech and due process under the fourteenth amendment
ad been violated because his publicly expressed views were the
reasons for nonrenewal of his contract. He claimed further that
he was entitled to a pretermination hearing. 25 The district court,
agreeing with this latter claim, granted partial summary judg-
ment ordering the University to provide Roth with a statement of
reasons and a hearing.26 The court of appeals affirmed. 27 In its
review of Roth, the Supreme Court addressed only the procedural
due process rights of Roth under the fourteenth amendment and
did not consider the first amendment claim upon which the dis-
trict court based its denial of summary judgment28 for the Uni-
versity, since the evidence for this claim had to be developed at
20 Id. at 571.
1 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
2 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
13 The notice of Roth's faculty appointment specified that his employment
would begin on September 1, 1968 and would end on June 30, 1969. Roth techni-
cally had no contract of employment. Rather, this formal notice of appointment
was the equivalent of a contract of employment.
24 Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
25 Id. at 974.
28 Id. at 983-84.
. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
Summary judgment is granted when there are no material facts in the con-
troversy to be litigated and where the party seeking summary judgment is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
[Vol. 83
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In Sindermann, the companion case to Roth, the fact situa-
tion was significantly different. Robert Sindermann had been em-
ployed at Odessa Junior College in Odessa, Texas for four years
on a series of one-year contracts. At that time Odessa had no ten-
ure system.29 Sindermann had six years of prior teaching experi-
ence in the Texas State College System. In May of his fourth year
at Odessa, Sindermann was notified that his contract would not
be renewed. Subsequent to notification of nonrenewal, the Board
of Regents publicly alleged insubordination by Sindermann yet
refused to provide him with an official statement of reasons for
nonrenewal or with an opportunity to be heard.
Early in that academic year Sindermann had testified before
the state legislature expressing a position regarding the status of
Odessa College which was opposed by the Board of Regents. In
federal district court Sindermann claimed that his nonrenewal
was based on his public statements and that the Board of Re-
gents, therefore, infringed upon his right of free speech. He as-
serted, furthermore, that the Board denied him his fourteenth
amendment right to due process by refusing to provide a hearing.
The district court granted summary judgment for the College 0
but was reversed by the court of appeals, which felt that a full
hearing on the contested facts was necessary.3 1 The court of ap-
peals further held that despite Sindermann's nontenured status,
his contract nonrenewal would be impermissible if it violated his
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.
3 2
The main issue in both Roth and Sindermann was whether
the faculty member concerned had a constitutional right to a
statement of reasons and a hearing on a decision not to rehire
him. The Court in Roth noted first that the requirements of pro-
cedural due process apply only when there has been a deprivation
of interests protected by the fourteenth amendment, i.e., liberty
and property, and second that the range of interests protected by
2" Odessa College in March, 1972, following the Supreme Court decision,
adopted a formal tenure policy.
30 Sindermann v. Perry, No. MO-69-CA34 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1969). Since
this decision was only several lines long, it was not officially reported.
31 Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970).
32 Id. at 943.
1980]
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procedural due process is not infinite.33 In Roth the Court, in
what seemed to be a deviation from previous decisions, 4 em-
ployed a two-step analysis to determine whether Roth had a right
to a statement of reasons and a hearing. The first step is to deter-
mine whether due process requirements apply by looking to the
nature of the interest at stake, specifically whether it is a prop-
erty or liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. It
is only after this step has been completed and an interest has
been found that the process of weighing the plaintiff's interest in
securing his job against the institution's need for unfettered dis-
c:retion in its employment practices comes into play. 5 This bal-
ancing process is applied in the second step to determine the
form of hearing and the extent of procedural due process
required.
36
To understand the decisions in Roth and Sindermann, as
well as subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 7 it is necessary to
analyze the meanings of liberty and property. As the Court ob-
served in Roth: "[W]hile the Court has eschewed rigid or formal-
istic limitations on the protection of procedural due process, it
has at the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words
'liberty' and 'property' in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment must be given some meaning. ' 's
C. The Property Interest
1. The Supreme Court Rationale
With respect to property interests the Court, citing several of
408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 -(1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
35 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). Since the Court did not find a property or a
liberty interest in Roth's case, it was not required to address the second step, or
the balancing process.
31 See Peacock v. Board of Regents, 510 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1049 (1975); Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
948 (1975).
1 See, e.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
[Vol. 83
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its previous decisions,3 9 announced the standard to be used in de-
termining the existence of a property interest: "To have a prop-
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or a desire for it. He must have more than a unilat-
eral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it."' 0 The Court further explained that property
interests are not created by the Constitution but rather are cre-
ated and defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law-rules or under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits.
4 1
In Roth's case a property interest would have to have been
created and defined by the terms of his employment, by the state
statutes relating to granting tenure at public institutions, or by
university rules or policies securing his interest in reemployment
or creating any legitimate claim to it. The Court found that the
terms of Roth's appointment specifically provided that his em-
ployment was to terminate on June 30; and, therefore, they "se-
cured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next
year.' 42 Moreover, the Court found no claim of entitlement by
way of any state statute or university rule or policy. "In these
circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern in
being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to
require the University authorities to give him a hearing when
they declined to renew his contract of employment."'4 Despite
Roth's observation that most teachers hired on a year-to-year
basis by Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh were, in fact, re-
39 Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, modified on denial of re-
hearing, 351 U.S. 944 (1956); Wiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
40 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
41 Id. The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 603-04 (1972), emphasized that the relationship between a state
institution and its faculty is primarily a matter of state law. State law determines
whether a faculty member has a legitimate entitlement to renewal. Moreover,
Chief Justice Burger recommended that a federal court abstain from deciding the
procedural due process issue in a case where relevant state law is unclear. 408 U.S.
at 604. This view regarding the preeminence of state law is reflected in the major-
ity opinion in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), where the Court refused to
independently examine the state law involved.
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hired,44 the Court noted that the district court had not found
anything approaching a "common law"4 5 of reemployment strong
enough to require procedural due process.
Justice Douglas, dissenting from the majority opinion in
Roth, cited several previous Supreme Court cases implicating
"'important interests' of the citizen," adding that "nonrenewal of
a teacher's contract, whether or not he has tenure, is an entitle-
ment of the same importance and dignity."41 Justice Marshall
even more vigorously dissented, expressing his view that "every
citizen who applies for a government job is entitled to it unless
the government can establish some reason for denying the em-
ployment. This is the 'property' right that I believe is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment and that cannot be denied 'with-
out due process of law.' ,,47 Justice Marshall relied on the four-
teenth amendment's safeguard against arbitrary government ac-
tion and its equal protection clause: "[I]t is procedural due
process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protec-
tio:a against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government
action.''4s
2. Other Interpretations
Some interpretations of the Roth and Sindermann decisions
4 Only three of 442 nontenured faculty at the University in addition to Roth
were notified that their contracts would not be renewed for the 1969-70 academic
year. See Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors,
1970 DuKe L.J. 841, 872.
4' In Sindermann, the Court referred to the process by which unwritten
agreements may be implied. Agreements supplementing contractual provisions
may be implied from the promisor's words and conduct interpreted in light of the
surrounding circumstances and past usage. This concept of an unwritten "com-
mon law" in a particular university is an extension of the concept as applied to
collective bargaining. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
See also Fiskin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 575
(1973).
46 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972).
"4 Id. at 588.
48 Id. at 589. As one writer, commenting on Roth, stated: "Since fairness of
procedure is the underlying issue, however, the Court's firm stand on the nonexis-
tence of a property or liberty interest seems questionable in view of the forceful
and logical argument of the dissenters." Seitz, Due Process for Public School
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seem to imply that where there is a tenure system, only faculty
members who have attained tenure status 49 or those entitled to
tenure have a property interest.5 0 If this accurately summarizes
the concept of a property interest in educational employment, the
decision in Roth would have been easy. Roth in his first one-year
contract certainly had no right to tenure. Even Roth himself
would never have claimed that. But that is not the issue in Roth.
The issue is rather whether Roth had any claim or entitlement to
renewal of his contract or to reappointment.
In an institution with a formal tenure policy, there are usu-
ally several types of contracts, each one denominated and de-
scribed differently, e.g., limited or special contract, terminal con-
tract, probationary contract, and tenure contract. Institutions
may specify that all contracts are for a one-year term only,51 os-
tensibly to limit their legal liabilities upon termination. However,
what most people do not realize, and apparently what the United
States Supreme Court did not realize, is that the common dura-
tion of these contracts does not make them identical or even
equivalent in the minds of either faculty or administrators. Dif-
ferent expectations, not unilaterial but mutual, attach to the dif-
ferent categories of contracts. For example, it is mutually under-
stood that a terminal contract is for a period of one year and will
not be renewed in any case. A limited or special contract, al-
though for a specific duration, usually one year, explicity or im-
pliedly provides that the institution, at its discretion, may extend
the contract. A probationary contract is usually one entered into
by the institution and the faculty member with the common un-
derstanding that the position which the faculty member holds is a
tenure-track position52 and if the faculty member lives up to the
'9 See note 98 infra and accompanying text. "While many issues surrounding
tenure await resolution, the essential doctrine of Roth and Sindermann remains:
Tenure grants to an individual a property interest that cannot be violated without
the procedural protections of due process." Winn, Teacher Nonrenewal In North
Carolina, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 739, 753 (1978).
80 McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W.Va. 1978). See text accompanying
note 98 infra. See also Haimowitz v. University of Nev., 579 F.2d 526 (1978) (no
reasonable expectation of employment for nontenured faculty where there is a for-
mal tenure code).
5' Even tenured faculty are often issued one-year contracts with regard to
salary and other negotiable terms.
52 Tenure does not inhere in every teaching position; faculty members can
1980]
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expectations the institution had when it hired him, then he
should be awarded tenure. This is certainly what a typical faculty
member accepting such a position believes.53 Moreover, if one is
not to attach different expectations to different types of con-
tracts, there would be no reason for the contracts to have differ-
ent names, different qualifications for the position, different ap-
plicable institutional procedures, and different customs and
practices." Any penetrating analysis of contracts at an institution
with a formal tenure system would compel the conclusion that the
contracts are not all mere one-year contracts with no claim of en-
titlement to renewal. If they are simply one-year contracts, there
is no need for more than two types of contracts-tenure and non-
tenure. The Court in Roth makes no mention of the meaning of a
probationary contract as opposed to a simple one-year contract.
Whether the Court was simply unaware of this distinction, or
chose to ignore it, is not known. Perhaps Roth did not argue this
distinction, although it certainly would have strengthened his
position.
An unfortunate aspect of the Roth decision is the particular
set of facts through which the Court chose to interpret the Con-
stitution. Had Roth been into his second or third year and had he
argued a legitimate expectation of continued employment as a
expect to be considered for tenure only in certain, specified positions. The term
tenure-track refers to a full-time teaching position to be filled by a faculty mem-
ber who will be eligible for tenure upon the satisfactory completion of a probation-
ary period. Such a position is to be distinguished from one which does not involve
a probationary period and will not lead to tenure. Examples of the latter include
part.time and temporary teaching positions.
In fact, this representation of a tenure-track position is what attracts most
teachers to positions in a college or university. Furthermore, the probationary pe-
riod sets an outer limit, in most cases, for duration of employment without tenure
since an institution which follows AAUP guidelines must terminate an individual
if it does not confer tenure. It is ludicrous to think that teachers expect (or admin-
istrators expect them) to move with their families to a place, settle down, teach
one year, and then pick up stakes and move on for another year, etc. A strict
construction of these one-year contracts would imply just that. See Frakt, Non-
Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 KAN. L. Rzv. 27, 35 (1969): "Unlike
purely political appointees whose non-retention with changes in policy or adminis-
tration is a matter of custom, teachers are normally retained unless they are guilty
of incompetence or some other serious failure of desirability for their position."
For example, a faculty member on a probationary contract is normally
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probationary teacher, the results might have been different. As
Professor Van Alstyne notes, the Court made its finding of no le-
gitimate expectation of continued employment under the state
statutes or university regulations in the absence of any evidence
to the contrary. As he suggests further, there may be situations in
which, "on a better record, under more compelling circumstances
where the faculty member is well along the tenure track under
policies explicitly encouraging reliance and practices consistent
with that reliance, peremptory notice of nonreappointment may
not be enough to quench the constitutional claim to more specific
consideration than none at all."55 This suggestion is supported by
language in Roth: "It is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.""
This reliance concept 57  appears even more strongly in
Sindermann. As Justice Stewart, speaking of Sindermann, stated:
"He claimed that he and others legitimately relied upon an un-
usual provision that had been in the college's official Faculty
Guide for many years:... ""
Roth and Sindermann, as the most important cases in the
area of teachers' rights in a decade, are deficient in one major
"Van Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured: A Comment
on Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 58 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 267,
270 (1972).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (emphasis added).
67 The reliance concept of property has been used to explain why statutory
entitlement should be a form of property as the Supreme Court, in a series of
decisions, has concluded it is. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (conclud-
ing that statute did not create entitlement); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332 (1976) (social security disability benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-74
(1975) (public education); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389-90 (1975) (unem-
ployment compensation); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166 (1974) (tenured
public employment); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (old age bene-
fits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare payments). See also
Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 Ymmz L. Rav. 695
(1977).
" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600 (1972) (emphasis added). The pro-
vision stated:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administra-
tion of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has perma-
nent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long
as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his
superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work.
1980]
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respect: they do not speak directly to the typical, nontenured
teacher nonrenewal situation. Instead, they represent two ex-
tremes-a first-year contract and de facto tenure. It is difficult to
disagree with the results in these two instances. The first year is a
special time in the employer-employee relationship. It is the time
when obvious errors in hiring come to the forefront and when dis-
satisfactions on the part of the institution or the teacher manifest
themselves. But what about the situation in between these two?
This is the one case which would clarify the Court's position.
The Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals in
Sindermann that procedural due process protects "a mere subjec-
tive expectancy" 5 and indicated in Roth that a unilateral expec-
tation was not sufficient.60 But this is not to say it ruled out all
expectations. The Court explicitly stated in Sindermann that a
nontenured teacher must be given an opportunity to prove a le-
gitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment based on
"the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fos-
tered by state officials" and "in light of 'the policies and practices
of the institution.' "61 The Court seemed to be defining the lower
and upper limits in the area of public employment of faculty and
to be challenging faculty to present an intermediate situation in
which the practices and policies of the institution and state offi-
cials entitle the faculty member to more than a mere one-year
term of appointment. Surely, the experience of most college and
university faculty members compels the conclusion that this in-
termediate situation is more typical.
These decisions should be read in conjunction with the Su-
preme Court decisions involving due process rights of other
groups." It seems unlikely that the Court intended to "[mark]
'9 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972). At least one writer has argued for the preference
of the expectancy doctrine over the Roth-Sindermann rule because "it more
clearly identifies the minimum property interests to be protected by due process
[and]. . . gives more adequate protection to the substantive rights of public em-
ployees." Ground, Due Process and the Untenured Teacher: A Review of Roth
and Sindermann, 10 URw. L. ANN. 283, 296 (1975).
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
S1 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (quoting Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939,
943 (5th Cir. 1970)).
See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (policemen); Goss v. Lopez,




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss1/8
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
teachers as a singularly unfavored group in our society"63 as one
commentator has suggested. Although, as stated by this commen-
tator, "[i]t is simply not debatable that Roth has ended any claim
on the part of the nontenured teacher that there is a Fourteenth
Amendment right to a statement of reasons and/or a hearing in-
herent in every nonrenewal."" However, it still is debatable
whether Roth has ended such a claim in any nonrenewal.
D. The Liberty Interest
The Supreme Court in Roth and Sindermann addressed not
only the property interest issue but also the issue of a liberty in-
terest. While not attempting to define liberty exactly, the Court
did state:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to en-
gage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.6 5
The Court noted that the meaning of liberty must be broad and
that a case in which the state refused to reemploy a person under
certain circumstances could implicate interests in liberty, but
Roth is not such a case. 6e
The Court proceeded to further define the liberty interest by
example in the context of Roth. A nonrenewal decision making a
charge against the teacher which "might seriously damage his
standing and associations in the community," such as "that he
had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality," would implicate
his liberty interest.6 7 Likewise, if the state through nonrenewal
" Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does the Nontenured Teacher Have a Consti-
tutional Right to a Hearing Before Nonrenewal?, 61 ILL. B.J. 464, 467 (1973).
Id. (emphasis added).
"Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
66 Id. at 572-73.
6, Id. at 573. See Stevens, Evaluation of Faculty Competence as a "Privi-
leged Occasion," 4 J.C. & U.L. 281 (1977), for a discussion of a damage suit in
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imposes on the teacher "a stigma or other disability that fore-
closed his freedom to take advantage of other employment oppor-
tunities,"8 81 a claim of deprivation of liberty would be valid. To
exemplify this deprivation, the Court cited a hypothetical situa-
tion where the state invokes a regulation to bar a teacher from all
other public employment in state universities.69 Summarizing the
majority opinion concerning Roth's interest in liberty, Justice
Stewart stated:
[O]n the record before us, all that clearly appears is that the
respondent was not rehired for one year at one university. It
stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is de-
prived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but
remains as free as before to seek another.10
Dissenting from this majority opinion and supporting Roth's lib-
erty interest, Justice Douglas noted: "Nonrenewal of a teacher's
contract is tantamount in effect to a dismissal and the conse-
quences may be enormous. Nonrenewal can be a blemish that
turns into a permanent scar and effectively limits any chance the
teacher has of being rehired as a teacher, at least in his State.
7 1
Justice Marshall, also dissenting, emphasized, "it is also lib-
erty-liberty to work-which is the 'very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity' secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment."72
Although the Court found no deprivation of a liberty interest
in Roth, it does not appear that the Court has ruled out the possi-
bility of such a deprivation in a situation like Roth's. As a matter
of fact, the Court seemed to set the stage for a record which
would implicate a liberty interest in the nonrenewal of a proba-
tionary teacher's contract. Referring to lower court opinions in
408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 575.
71 Id. at 585. Moreover, as one writer has indicated, "[tihe current oversupply
of teachers at every educational level in most parts of the nation may well mean
that. the stigma of nonrenewal will jeopardize a teaching career as much as dis-
misal during the year does." Note, Procedural Due Process Protection for Proba-
tionary Teachers' First Amendment Rights: Bekiaris v. Board of Education, 24
HAsT GS L.J. 1227, 1249-50 (1973) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as First
Amendment Rights].
7 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972).
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Roth, the Supreme Court observed:
But even assuming, arguendo, that such a 'substantial adverse
effect' under these circumstances would constitute a state-im-
posed restriction on liberty, the record contains no support for
these assumptions. There is no suggestion of how nonretention
might affect a respondent's future employment prospects.
Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in one
job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of fore-
closure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of
'liberty.' 3
It seems fairly obvious that here the Court is indicating, eviden-
tiary support for imposition of a stigma or limitation of future
employment opportunities by nonrenewal is what the Roth case
lacked, and a case which provides such support would make all
the difference in the decision. The type of evidence or proof
which could potentially accomplish what Roth apparently failed
to accomplish falls into two categories. First, one could offer proof
of actual events or acts involving the particular faculty member
which demonstrates either stigma or limitation of employment
opportunities. Examples in this category of proof are a file folder
full of employment rejections, statements made in interviews im-
plicating the nonrenewal decision and the rejection, or evidence of
uncomplimentary letters of recommendation or negative re-
sponses to inquiries. Second, if it is difficult to procure evidence
in the particular case, evidence of the current job market, faculty
supply and demand, experiences of others in similar circum-
stances, and, perhaps, a scientific survey or expert testimony of
representative hiring officials as to how prior nonrenewal affects
their hiring decisions would support the "assumptions" of which
Justice Stewart spoke in Roth.
The discussion in the majority opinion of liberty interests has
apparently caused some confusion. Some commentators have read
this discussion very narrowly inferring that the damaged reputa-
tion depends on the particular manner in which or methods by
which reasons for nonrenewal are announced.7 ' The logic of the
73 Id. at 574 n.13.
74 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (concurring opin-
ion); Seitz, Due Process for Public School Teachers in Nonrenewal and Discharge
Situations, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 881, 890-91 (1974); First Amendment Rights, supra
1980]
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situation argues against this narrow interpretation. Such an inter-
pretation implies that deprivation of liberty based on damage to
reputation can only occur when the state has given reasons for
nonrenewal. But this is what Roth was seeking-a statement of
reasons.75 Is the decision to be read as saying that when no rea-
sons for nonrenewal have been given, the teacher automatically
has no claim to a deprivation of liberty or to a liberty interest
from damage to reputation? On the contrary it appears obvious
that the decision must be read as implying that a decision of non-
renewal in the absence of stated reasons can be shown by ade-
quate proof to impose a stigma on the teacher or to damage his
reputation. The absence of stated reasons in some cases can do as
much or more harm to reputation than stated reasons because it
allows the rumor mill to run wild .
7
II. SuBsTANTiVE DuE PROCESS
A major issue presented in both Roth and Sindermann dealt
with the abridgement of free speech or rights under the first
amendment, although the Supreme Court did not, in fact, devote
much of its opinion to it and did not decide it. Roth alleged that
the reason underlying his nonrenewal was the exercise of his first
amendment rights.7 The Court indicated that this allegation was
not before it in Roth because the district court stayed proceedings
on this issue; however, the Court did address itself to the court of
appeals' argument that a statement of reasons and a hearing were
required here "as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions
improperly motivated by exercise of protected rights."78 Although
note 71, at 1258.
75 "[Roth] alleged that the failure of University officials to give him notice of
any reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to
procedural due process of law." 408 U.S. at 569.
" Alternatively the decision may serve to add fuel to already existing rumors
in a case where false gossip of the faculty member's private life or groundless ru-
mors about his teaching actually contributed to the decision. "[A]U too often non-
reelection is equated with dismissal for cause. Such an equation limits any
teacher's opportunity and likelihood of obtaining future employment in educa-
tion." Comment, Procedural Due Process Protection of Liberty Interests in Pro-
bationary Teacher Re-Employment, 22 S.D.L. REv. 180, 198 (1977).
7 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
78 Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1971), quoted in
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1972).
[Vol. 83
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it has "on occasion" held that a hearing prior to state action
which would directly impinge upon free speech or press rights is
necessary, the Court indicated that in this case:
[T]he State has not directly impinged upon interests in free
speech or free press in any way comparable to a seizure of
books or an injunction against meetings. Whatever may be a
teacher's rights of free speech, the interest in holding a teach-
ing job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free
speech interest. 9
While one may not disagree with this latter statement, it is diffi-
cult to see how it is relevent to Roth's claim since Roth did not
claim that his free speech interest was in holding a teaching job.
Furthermore, the Court's vigorous reaffirmation of the invio-
lability of first amendment rights in Sindermann seems to con-
tradict this attitude of the Court regarding a hearing in Roth. The
Court stated in Sindermann:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associa-
tions, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penal-
ized and inhibited. This would allow the government to "pro-
duce a result which [it] could not command directly" . . .
Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. 0
79 Id.
80 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citation omitted). The pro-
hibition against restricting first amendment freedoms is not absolute. The Su-
preme Court has established a balancing test for determining when the state has a
legitimate right to interfere with these freedoms. The interests of the faculty
member, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern must be
weighed against the interests of the state, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
cient functioning of the institution. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968). California has established guidelines for judicially determining the legality
of governmental restrictions upon public employees' rights: (1) the political re-
straints must rationally relate to the enhancement of the public service; (2) the
benefits which the public gains by the restraints must outweigh the resulting im-
pairment of constitutional rights; and (3) there must be no available alternative
1980]
17
Grill: Due Process Protection for Nontenured Faculty in Public Instituti
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The Court cited extensively to prior decisions noting that it had
"applied the principle regardless of the public employee's con-
tractual or other claim to a job" 811 and had "specifically held that
the nonrenewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year
contract may not be predicated on his exercise of First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.18 2 The Court in Sindermann held that
summary judgment against Sindermann was improper because he
must be given the opportunity "to show that the decision not to
renew his contract was, in fact, made in retaliation for his exer-
cise of the constitutional right of free speech."83 However, in a
footnote to the opinion in Sindermann, the Court reaffirmed its
rejection in Roth of a right to a hearing for a teacher who simply




In Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle,8s the Court
promulgated a test for determining whether there has been a vio-
lation of constitutionally protected rights sufficient to justify re-
medial action. In this case of nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher,
the district court found that the teacher's exercise of free speech
contributed substantially to the decision not to rehire him. The
Supreme Court held that the fact that constitutionally protected
conduct played a substantial part in the decision did not necessa-
rily amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial ac-
tion. The test which should have been applied, according to the
Court, is whether the governing body showed by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision even
in the absence of the protected conduct.88 The rationale for this
test is that an employee ought not to be able, by engaging in pro-
tected conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his per-
formance and reaching a decision not to rehire which is supported
less subversive of constitutional rights. Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp.
Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 501-02, 421 P.2d 409, 411, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1966).
" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
2 Id. at 598. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
83 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972) (emphasis added).
Id. at 599 n.5.
85 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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by that assessment.8 7
The rationale of this Court poses a major dilemma for a col-
lege or university, nontenured teacher who has good reason to be-
lieve that his nonrenewal is in retaliation for his exercise of con-
stitutional rights. On the one hand, he must establish a liberty or
property interest in a court of law before he is entitled to a state-
ment of reasons and an administrative hearing where he can chal-
lenge the alleged impermissible basis of the nonrenewal. On the
other hand, if he chooses not to claim entitlement to procedural
due process or if he has no claim of entitlement, he must prove in
a court of law that the decision was based on impermissible rea-
sons8 8 and had no other basis in fact. Thus he is forced to engage
in a guessing game as to the reasons the administration will assert
so that he may effectively refute them in order to establish his
contention of impermissible reasons.8 9 By effectively making it ar-
guable in any nontenured case whether the teacher is entitled to a
statement of reasons and a hearing, the Supreme Court has
forced every nontenured teacher faced with nonrenewal either to
file a lawsuit with its attendant costs in time and money or to
give up the fight altogether and move on (to another job, if one
exists, or out of the profession"°). It is difficult to believe that this
is what the Supreme Court intended.
In Bekiaris v. Board of Education,1 the California Supreme
Court attempted to close this loophole "in the constitutional pro-
- 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
s1 Although there are liberal discovery rights available to the faculty member,
most institutions are careful not to put in permanent form in intramural memo-
randa and records any reason which can be used against them. Memoranda and
institutional records will probably contain quotes taken directly from the faculty
manual, from applicable state laws, or from rules and regulations which they know
will be acceptable as reasons whether or not they represent the true reasons. Fur-
thermore, although the faculty member has the right to discovery once he files the
lawsuit, this may be his first opportunity to find out the reasons the college alleges
for the decision. This is too late for the faculty member to use such information in
assessing whether he has a good enough case to fie a lawsuit in the first place. If
he finds at this point that the college has a supportable reason, he is faced with
the decision whether to drop the case and suffer embarrassment at least or to
pursue it and probably lose.
90 The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
91 6 Cal. 3d 575, 493 P.2d 480, 100 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1972).
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tections of public employees. '92 The court held that a probation-
ary teacher has a right to an administrative and judicial hearing
to ascertain the true reasons for his nonrenewal when he alleges
the reason was his exercise of his constitutional rights.9 s This ap-
pears to be the only reasonable solution to the problem - the
only way to substantially reduce the ability of an administration
to couch unconstitutional nonrenewal decisions behind unjustified
reasons. As one writer has suggested, "California's broadened un-
derstanding of the procedural due process required to protect a
probationary teacher's constitutional rights against covert attacks
should encourage judges and legislators in other states to develop
similar procedural safeguards.""
III. THE RIGHTS OF NONTENURED FACULTY IN WEST VIRGINIA
A. Court Decisions
Both the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the
Fourth Circuit have applied the standard for a legitimate claim of
entitlement established in Roth.93 The West Virginia court has
held that a state civil service classified employee has a property
interest arising out of statutory entitlement to continued employ-
ment.98 Furthermore, the West Virginia court has found a suffi-
cient property interest to require procedural due process for a
university student facing expulsion.9 7 In terms of contract re-
,2 First Amendment Rights, supra note 71, at 1245.
93 Bekiaris v. Board of Educ., 6 Cal. 3d 575, 580, 493 P.2d 480, 481, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 16, 17 (1972).0
" First Amendment Rights, supra note 71, at 1227.
95 For cases in other jurisdictions which have followed the Roth and
Sindermann decisions, see Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 520 F.2d 1364 (3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Markwell v. Culwell, 515 F.2d 1258
(5th Cir. 1975); Cusumano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 829 (1975); Frazier v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir.
1974); Bradford v. Tarrant County Junior College Dist., 492 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.
1974); Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972); Tyler v. College of Wil-
liam & Mary, 429 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1977); Sament v. Hahnemann Medical
College & Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434 (D.C. Pa. 1976), affd mem., 547 F.2d 1164
(1977); Assaf v. University of Tex. Sys., 399 F. Supp. 1245 (D.C. Pa. 1975); Cotten
v. Board of Regents, 395 F. Supp. 388 (D.C. Ga.), affd, 515 F.2d 1098 (1974);
Loebeck v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 96 Idaho 459, 530 P.2d 1149 (1975); Salyers
v. Board of Governors, 26 IMI. Dec. 299, 387 N.E.2d 1129 (1979).
" Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
97 North v. Board of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977). See Lafferty v.
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newal, the Fourth Circuit has drawn the line at tenure and has
consistently maintained that position.ss
Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
McLendon v. Morton" held that a faculty member who had satis-
fied the objective eligibility standards for tenure adopted by a
state college had a sufficient entitlement such that she could not
be denied tenure on the issue of professional competency without
procedural due process.100 In McLendon an assistant professor at
Parkersburg Community College claimed that she was denied a
due process hearing on the college's decision not to grant her ten-
ure.101 She based her claim on the ground that the Board of Re-
gents' tenure standards established objective criteria which, if
met, created property interests sufficient to require a due process
hearing after the denial of tenure.10 2 In considering whether Mc-
Lendon had such a property interest, the West Virginia court
cited both Roth and Sindermann.103 In addition the court cited
its previous recognition10' that an analysis of property and liberty
interests is to be supplemented by the West Virginia Constitu-
tion's due process standards.10 5 The court noted that it was not
constrained by "the teachings of the United States Supreme
Court in its due process cases ' " as long as the state standard did
not drop below the federal standard.
The court in McLendon likened the nontenured teacher's sit-
Carter, 310 F. Supp. 465, 470 (W.D. Wis. 1970): "[W]ith respect to the right to
procedural due process, the protection to be afforded a professor can hardly be
less than that afforded a student, and probably should be greater." See also Note,
Teacher Tenure In Connecticut: Due Process Rights and "Do Process" Responsi-
bilities, 8 CONN. L. Rav. 690, 693-94 (1976).
91 Sheppard v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 516 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1974);
Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1973); Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359, 360
(4th Cir. 1972) ("These teachers were not tenured and there was no basis for any
reasonable expectancy of permanent employment.").
249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978).
O Id. at 925.
101 Id. at 920.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 922.
104 See Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977).
'05 W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10 reads in full: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his
peers."
'" McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919, 922 (W. Va. 1978).
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uation to application for state-derived benefits where the appli-
cant has met the eligibility requirements. The West Virginia
court had held that action with respect to applications for li-
censes cannot be arbitrary or capricious. 107 Although the concept
of property entitlement was not specifically used in finding a lack
of procedural due process in these licensing cases, this basic prin-
ciple was involved.
In McLendon the West Virginia court found the nontenured
teacher had met the eligibility criteria to make application for
tenure. 08 However, she was not entitled to automatic tenure sta-
tus because the regulations of the Board of Regents and of the
college established teaching competency as a further criterion for
tenure.109 Competency, or an evaluation of the teacher's profes-
20 Beverly Grill, Inc. v. Crow, 133 W. Va. 214, 57 S.E.2d 244 (1949) (applica-
tion for beer license); Hoffman v. Town of Clendenin, 92 W. Va. 618, 115 S.E. 583
(1923) (pool hall license).
'03 WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF REGENTS, POLICY REGARDING AcADEMIc FREEDOM
AND RESPONSmrILITY, OppoRUNrry, PROMOTION, TENURE AND TERMINATION OF
EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL, AMENDED POLICY BULLETIN No. 36,
adopted June 11, 1974 [hereinafter referred to as BULLEMN] contains the following
provisions regarding tenure:
8. Tenure
C. Tenure status may be attained by all full-time employees who hold
faculty rank of Assistant Professor or above and whose major assign-
ment is of an academic nature and shall not be contingent upon promo-
tion in rank....
9. Probation
C. The maximum period of probation shall not exceed seven years; and
at the end of six years any non-tenured faculty member will be given
notice in writing of tenure, or offered a one-year written terminal con-
tract of employment. Any reduction in this period may be determined at
the discretion of the president of each institution within the following
guidelines:
(2) An Assistant Professor may be eligible for consideration for tenure
at the end of three years in that rank and at that institution.
(3) An Associate Professor or Professor may be eligible for considera-
tion for tenure at the end of two years in these ranks and at that
institution.
109 McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919, 925 (W. Va. 1978).
Courts seem reluctant to interfere with the tenure decision as such, rec-
ognizing the need of schools and universities to make their own faculty
[Vol. 83
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sional skills, becomes the basic substantive issue once the eligibil-
ity criteria are fulfilled. 110 McLendon, therefore, requires proce-
dural due process after tenure is denied in all cases where the
objective eligibility criteria have been satisfied.
B. Legislative Action
The legislature in 1969 created the West Virginia Board of
Regents, a corporation with the responsibilities of "general deter-
mination, control, supervision and management of the financial,
business, and educational policies and affairs of all state colleges
and universities.""' In so doing, the legislature abolished the
Board of Governors of West Virginia University'" and subse-
quently the State Commission on Higher Education"" and trans-
ferred the powers, duties, and authorities of the West Virginia
Board of Education with respect to colleges and universities to
the Board of Regents."
4
Section 8, article 26, chapter 18 of the West Virginia Code
authorizes and empowers the Board of Regents to make, promul-
gate, modify, amend, and enforce rules and regulations regarding
employment, tenure, and nonreemployment of faculty members
at state colleges and universities"15 and to set standards for the
hiring, tenure, and dismissal of faculty." e In execution of this
authorization the Board of Regents promulgated its policy
determinations in the best interests of the institution. Courts have not
granted tenure to teachers when the institutions clearly did not want
them tenured, even when an interpretation of the language (statutes or
regulations) suggesting that tenure was appropriate, was possible.
Winn, supra note 49, at 753.
See also, Citron v. Jackson State Univ., 456 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Miss. 1977), aff'd
mem., 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp.
602 (D. Md. 1977); Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D.
Pa. 1976); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (1975); Green v.
Board of Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1973).
110 McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919, 925 (W. Va. 1978).
m W. VA. CODE § 18-26-1 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
112 W. VA. CODE § 18-26-11 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
" W. VA. CODE § 18-26-13 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
"' W. VA. CODE § 18-26-12 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
12 See Sheppard v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 378 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.W. Va.
1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1975).
'2 See McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978).
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bulletin.17
The Bulletin contains a statement regarding academic free-
dom and responsibility" as well as a statement regarding ten-
ure.11  As is common among colleges and universities, the Board
27 BULLETIN, supra note 108.
I'8 Id. at 2-3.
The necessity of academic freedom at West Virginia state colleges and
universities is self-evident. The West Virginia Board of Regents recog-
nizes that the vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the colleges and universities under its jurisdiction.
Faculty members and students must always remain free to inquire,
study, and evaluate.
Academic freedom guarantees the liberty of members of the aca-
"demic community to freely study, discuss, investigate, teach, conduct re-
search and publish, depending upon their particular role at the institu-
tion. Administrators shall have the same freedom in these areas. While
the term "academic freedom" is Snost often used in describing the rights
of faculty members of a college or university, students are also entitled
to the right of academic freedom. To all of those members of the aca-
demic community who enjoy academic freedom, there are, commensu-
rate with such freedom, certain responsibilities.
Faculty members, whether tenured or on probationary status, shall
be entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the re-
sults of such research, subject to the adequate performance of their
other academic duties which may include designated research, extension
service, and other professional duties. Further, each faculty member is
entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing the subject taught. In
addition, when faculty members speak or write as citizens outside of the
college or university, they shall be free from institutional censorship or
discipline.
The concept of academic freedom should be accompanied by an
equally important concept of academic responsibility. The faculty mem-
ber at a West Virginia state college or university is a citizen, a member
of a learned profession and a representative of an educational institu-
tion. As such, a faculty member, together with all members of the aca-
demic community, has the responsibility for protecting, defending, and
promoting individual academic freedom and academic freedom for all
members of the community. The faculty member is responsible also as a
teacher for striving to speak with accuracy and with respect for the simi-
lar rights and responsibilities of others. In speaking only as an individ-
ual or for a limited group, the faculty member should not imply or claim
to be a spokesman for the institution in which employed.
219 Id. at 7.
8. Tenure:
a. Tenure is a system designed to protect academic freedom and
to provide professional stability for the experienced faculty mei-
[Vol. 83
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of Regents limits every appointment of academic personnel at any
institution in West Virginia to one fiscal year"0 and requires that
the written appointing document contain the terms and condi-
tions of the appointment with the restriction that "any special
understandings stated therein shall be subject to the approval of
the Board of Regents, or otherwise such special understandings
shall be void. '121 The purpose of this restriction is, apparently, to
protect the Board of Regents from any inadvertent language in an
appointing document on which a nontenured faculty member
could base a claim of entitlement.
With regard to probationary appointments, the Bulletin fixes
the maximum period of probation at seven years with the tenure
decision to be made at the end of the sixth year..At this time the
faculty member is to be given written notice of tenure or is to be
offered a one-year terminal contract.122 In any case, the Bulletin
specifies that tenure is not granted automatically but must result
from action by the Board of Regents. 1 23 Section 9.H. of the Bulle-
tin specifies when notice of renewal or nonrenewal must be
given."
24
ber. It is a means of protection against the capricious dismissal of
an individual who has served faithfully and well in the academic
community. Continuous self-evaluation as well as periodic evalua-
tion by peer and administrative personnel is essential to the via-
bility of the tenure system. Tenure should never be permitted to
mask irresponsibility, mediocrity, or deliberate refusal to meet ac-
ademic requirements or professional responsibilities. Tenure ap-
plies to those faculty members who qualify for it and is a means
of making the teaching and research profession attractive to per-
sons of ability.
220 BULLETIN, supra note 108, at 4.
221 Id. at 4-5.
122 Id. at 8.
123 Id. at 7. At some institutions a faculty member automatically acquires ten-
ure when his length of service exceeds the maximum probationary period. For
cases finding attainment of tenure without affirmative action, see Chung v. Park,
369 F. Supp. 959 (M.D. Pa. 1974), supplemented, 377 F. Supp. 524 (M.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975); Bruno v. Detroit Inst. of Tech., 51 Mich.
App. 593, 215 N.W.2d 745 (1974).
124 BULLETIN, supra note 108, at 7.
9. Probation:
H. The president of each college or university shall give written notice
to nontenured faculty concerning their retention or non-retention as
1980]
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Prior to May, 1979 the Bulletin provided that probationary
appointments "may be terminated with or without cause at the
end of any contract year. During such probationary period no rea-
son for nonretention or nonreappointment need be given. ' 125 The
only protection afforded nontenured faculty in the Bulletin was in
section 9.G. which provided:
An appeal from the president's decision as to non-retention
may be made by the non-tenured faculty member to the Board
of Regents, which will review the decision of the president to
determine whether the same has afforded procedural due pro-
cess and was not in violation of the constitutional rights of the
non-tenured faculty member.12 6
It is not clear to what the phrase procedural due process re-
ferred since the Bulletin specifically provided that no statement
of reasons need be given and did not provide a hearing for non-
tenured faculty.127 Perhaps, this phrase referred to the procedures
established by the college and university as well as the Board of
Regents concerning notice and faculty evaluation. The only "con-
stitutional rights" to which this section could have referred are
the rights of free speech and free association. If such is the case,
the only function of the review would have been to consider
whether the decision was in retaliation for the exercise of a pro-
tected constitutional right. If the Board found that the decision
did abridge such a right, it remained unclear what action it was to
take since the Bulletin did not provide any procedures beyond
this review. The Bulletin seemed to imply that the Board could
overturn the decision or, at the least, remand it to the president
for reconsideration.
The Bulletin was revised in May 1979125 to reflect a 1979 leg-
islative enactment12' which requires that probationary faculty no-
follows:
(1) Not later than March 1 of the first academic year of service.
(2) Not later than December 15 of the second academic year of
service.
(3) At least one year before the expiration of an appointment
after two or more years of service in the institution.
1s Id. at 9.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
11 Id.
1" BuLLmIn, supra note 108, revised May 8, 1979.
'2' W. VA. CODE § 18-26-8c (Cum. Supp. 1980) reads:
[Vol. 83
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tified of nonrenewal be provided with a statement of reasons and
a hearing, upon request, before either an unbiased committee of
the Board or a hearing examiner with the right to be represented
by counsel. Section 8c further provides that "if the committee of
the board or the hearing examiner shall conclude that the reasons
for nonretention are arbitrary or capricious or without a factual
basis, the faculty member shall be retained for the ensuing aca-
demic year."130
This section of the code has not, as yet, been tested in the
The president of each state college, university or community college
shall give written notice to probationary faculty members concerning
their retention or nonretention for the ensuing academic year, not later
than the first day of March for those probationary faculty members who
are in their first academic year of service; not later than the fifteenth
day of December for those probationary faculty members who are in
their second academic year of service; and at least one year before the
expiration of an appointment for those probationary faculty members
who have been employed two or more years with the institution. Such
notice to those probationary faculty members who will not be retained
shall be by certified mail, return receipt requested. Upon request of the
probationary faculty member not retained, the president of the state
college, university or community college shall within ten days, and by
certified mail, inform the probationary faculty member of the reasons
for nonretention. Any probationary faculty member who desires to ap-
peal the decision may request a hearing from the board of regents
within ten days after receiving the statement of reasons. The board of
regents shall publish appropriate rules to govern the conduct of the ap-
peal herein allowed. The board of regents shall, by such rules, prescribe
either an unbiased committee of the board or appoint a hearing exam-
iner to hear such appeals. Such hearing shall be held at the employing
institution and within thirty days of the request. The rules of evidence
shall not strictly apply. The faculty member shall be accorded substan-
tive and procedural due process, including the right to produce evidence
and witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses, and to be represented by
counsel or other representative of his or her choice. If the committee of
the board or the hearing examiner shall conclude that the reasons for
nonretention are arbitrary or capricious or without a factual basis, the
faculty member shall be retained for the ensuing academic year. The
decision shall be rendered within thirty days after conclusion of the
hearing. The term "probationary faculty members," shall be defined ac-
cording to regulations promulgated by the board of regents.
The rights herein provided to probationary faculty members are in
addition to, and not in lieu of, other rights afforded them by other rules
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courts. Thus, for example, it is not clear whether the section
would cover a decision denying tenure at the end of the proba-
tionary period. Since there is a maximum period of probation
which must end by either the granting of tenure or termination of
the appointment, a denial of tenure at this time is equivalent to
nonretention. Therefore, one could argue that the statute covers
the denial of tenure. However, the statute makes no reference
whatsoever to tenure or to a tenure decision. Although interpreta-
tion of the statute will undoubtedly concern this issue, it will not
significantly affect the due process rights of faculty members
faced with denial of tenure because the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has established the right to due process in such
a case.13'
The West Virginia court by its decision in McLendon'5 2 ex-
panded the due process protection to include the nontenured
teacher eligible for tenure. The West Virginia Legislature com-
pleted this expansion by including all nontenured, probationary
faculty within due process protection. For several reasons, these
actions of the West Virginia court and the West Virginia Legisla-
ture extending procedural due process to nontenured faculty re-
present the optimum solution to the problems which have arisen
in the aftermath of Roth and Sindermann. First, these actions
recognize the fundamental unfairness in the Supreme Court deci-
sions. Even the Supreme Court, although unable or unwilling to
extend procedural due process, seemed to implicitly recommend
such a move in the following statement from the majority opinion
in Roth:
Our analysis of the respondent's constitutional rights in this
case in no way indicates the view that an opportunity for a
hearing or a statement of reasons for nonretention would, or
would not, be appropriate or wise in public colleges and uni-
versities. For it is a written Constitution that we apply. Our
role is confined to an interpretation of that Constitution.18'
An opportunity for a statement of reasons and an administrative
hearing not only protects the faculty member from arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or unfounded nonrenewal, but also protects the institu-
"I McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978).
33 408 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1972).
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tion from making a decision based on inaccurate or incomplete
information.
Second, the statute, while improving job security for nonten-
ured faculty, does not obviate tenure. Tenure will still be vigor-
ously sought by probationary faculty because it is the only way
they can remain at institutions in West Virginia for more than
seven years and because it represents increased job security. The
statute protects nontenured faculty from termination for reasons
which are "arbitrary, capricious, or without a factual basis.
s134
This still leaves a wide diversity of reasons for nonretention
which are in the best interests of the institution and in further-
ance of its goals. The appropriate reasons for dismissal of a ten-
ured faculty member have been limited to a few, select causes,135
and the statute does not disturb this. Furthermore, the burden of
proof requirements continue to separate the fenured from the
nontenured faculty member.136 The burden of proof is on the
nontenured faculty member to show that the reason for nonre-
newal is arbitrary, capricious, unsubstantiated, or impermissi-
ble.137 However, in the case of the dismissal of a tenured faculty
"3 W. VA. CODE § 18-26-8c (Cum. Supp. 1980).
11 BULLETrN, supra note 108, at 10.
11. Dismissal and Termination of Employment of Tenured Personnel:
a. Causes for Dismissal: The dismissal of a faculty member with
tenure, or of any faculty member before the end of a specified
period of appointment, shall be effected only pursuant to the pro-
cedures provided in these policies, and only for any of the follow-
ing causes:
(1) Demonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in the per-
formance of professional duties.
(2) Personal conduct which substantially impairs the in-
dividual's fulfillment of institutional responsibilities.
(3) Insubordination by refusal to abide by legitimate rea-
sonable directions of the administration or of the Board of
Regents.
(4) Physical or mental disability making the faculty mem-
ber unable, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
and by reasonably determined medical opinion, to perform
assigned duties.
(5) Substantial and manifest neglect of duty.
"3 Palmer, Due Process Termination of Untenured Teachers, 1 J.L. & EDUC.
469, 478-79 (1972).
7 See, e.g., Fluker v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir.
1971). See also Frazier v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir.
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member, the burden of proof shifts to the Board of Regents, or
relevant state agency, to show cause why the faculty member
should not be retained.""8 Thus, probationary status and tenure
status have not been merged into one by this statute as some had
feared would happen if nontenured faculty were guaranteed due
process.
Third, the statute further supports the institution's commit-
ment to academic freedom. Although all institutions zealously
protect academic freedom for all faculty,139 this protection has
been illusory for nontenured faculty. There has been no protec-
tion against termination for the exercise of academic freedom by
a nontenured faculty member.140 As a result probationary faculty
have been compelled to remain guarded in the expression of their
academic views-and in the manner in which they conduct classes
and research. As one writer noted in reaction to Roth and
Sindermann:
A teacher's probationary years are the years when his teaching
competency is examined, but too often they are also the years
when controversial teachers are weeded out of the educational
system by their more conventional superiors. By failing to pro-
tect all probationary teachers, the Supreme Court has failed to
protect a diversity of viewpoints and, assuming that such di-
versity is an ingredient of quality education, excellence in edu-
cation may suffer markedly.
14'
Fourth, providing procedural due process to all nontenured
faculty does not place too great a burden on the institutions or
1974).
I" Cf. Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524, 529 (M.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 514 F.2d
382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 948 (1975); AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129
N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846, 855 (1974), aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615
(1975).
139 Even the United States Supreme Court has taken a stand for academic
freedom:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teach-
ers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
10 See Part H supra.
141 First Amendment Rights, supra note 71, at 1259.
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state agencies. As Justice Marshall stated in his dissenting opin-
ion in Roth, "it is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons
exist.... As long as the government has a good reason for its
actions it need not fear disclosure. It is only where the govern-
ment acts improperly that procedural due process is truly bur-
densome. And that is precisely when it is most necessary.
' 142
Moreover, it must be recognized that not every faculty member
denied renewal will request a hearing, particularly if the institu-
tion involved adequately specifies the reasons for its decision and
the information on which the decision was based. The institution
will be protected by a well-reasoned and well-documented nonre-
newal decision. The burden placed on the institution is one of
making each decision regarding the renewal of nontenured faculty
carefully and on the basis of the most complete and most valid
data and information available to it. This may require colleges
and universities to review their faculty evaluation criteria and
procedures. However, these are not additional burdens imposed
on the institutions but responsibilities which they should already
have recognized.
Finally, the extension of procedural due process at the ad-
ministrative level will enable disputes to be resolved within the
institution rather than in the courts which is the more desirable
course for all concerned. The courts are reluctant to interfere
with decisions which require any academic expertise because they
do not want to substitute their judgments for those of acadenii-
cians.143 A lawsuit is costly both to the state and to the faculty
member in terms of time and money, and invariably, although
there is a judgment, neither side wins. It is a losing proposition
for all. The institution, if it prevails, takes a giant step backward
in terms of faculty-administration relations which affects faculty
morale and ultimately the academic enterprise. If the faculty
member prevails, he may gain the right to an administrative hear-
ing, but there is no guarantee of reemployment. An institution
forced by a judicial order to provide a statement of reasons and a
hearing may not be very receptive to a long term relationship
with the faculty member concerned. Thus, although the faculty
member may gain in the short run, he almost certainly loses in
142 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972).
143 See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978). See also cases cited note 109 supra.
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the long run.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the procedu-
ral due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Con-
stitution, has denied nontenured faculty at public institutions of
higher education the right to a hearing and a statement of reasons
upon notice of nonreappointment or contract nonrenewal unless
the faculty member can show a legitimate property or liberty in-
terest. These Supreme Court decisions have left unanswered
many questions concerning the requirements for the property and
liberty interests and, therefore, have only added fuel to the con-
troversy surrounding the issue of whether tenure should be re-
tained in higher education.
Rather than attempt to resolve this intensely debated issue,
the West Virginia Legislature wisely chose to improve the situa-
tion for nontenured faculty without disturbing the tenure system
by extending procedural due process protection to probationary
faculty. One can only hope that other state legislatures will re-
spond with similar enactments in an effort to preserve academic
freedom and scholarly creativity in higher education for all
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